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Entering 2004, we find an anti-globalization movement that has matured, now being called the global justice movement. The makeup of this movement in the US has been characterized as being composed of two constituencies, labor and “all the others.” The “others” can be categorized according to issues like health care, the environment, etc., and those concerned with fundamental matters regarding social structure, like economic justice and the protection of democracy from commercial encroachment. Intersecting most of these rough categories is a group defined functionally by the direct action strategies and tactics they use such as large street protests, some employing direct confrontation.

The direct action (DA) component of the global justice movement (GJM) has matured along with the broader movement. They came into the US popular consciousness during the 1999 Seattle protests of the World Trade Organization (WTO), hit their stride at Summit of the Americas in Quebec, but were compelled to go quiet soon after 9/11. They are presently feeling their way forward based on recent experiences at the September 2003 WTO meeting in Cancun, Mexico, and the November 2003 ministerial meetings on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in Miami, Florida.

The DA component of the GJM finds itself in the context of a broader movement that “shares the streets” with them. The police's use of overwhelming, violent force on the streets of Miami is causing DA activists to reconsider strategies and tactics. Baltimore GJM activist Ryan Harvey noted that, since Miami, discussions within global justice movement are on-going to reach understandings between DA activists and other constituencies. “...there are folks who want to march and there are folks who want to push against the line. We tried to have both in Miami and it put a lot of people at risk who did not want to be at risk..” Another Baltimore GJM activist, Mike McGuire, voiced similar views, with an eye toward public opinion of the movement, “If one group decides to battle the police while another one non-violently resists, the non-violent ones will be squashed, and the public might feel it justified.” Harvey continued, “While direct confrontation may be needed eventually ... I think we need to shy away from it for now. I think we need more numbers, more outreach, and some creative action.”
Interview with Ryan Harvey
Interview with Mike McGuire

This article reviews the broader context in which the DA movement finds itself at the beginning of a new year. Looking back at 2003, negotiations collapsed at the 5th Ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO), held during September in Cancun, Mexico. The failure of the Cancun meeting is sure to delay the schedule of completing the current round of WTO trade talks, which were to be concluded in January 2005. The Cancun WTO meeting also revealed the growing solidarity of emerging nations, highlighted by Kenya leading a walkout, which brought the meeting to a premature close. As Immanuel Wallerstein, world systems analyst and Senior Research Scholar at Yale, puts it, “the South called the bluff of the free traders.” The South said, 'no more subsidies to Northern producers, no more tariffs to keep out goods from the South.' Of course, the North never really wanted that to happen. So the so-called Group of 22 said, “Well then, bye-bye!”

The collapse of the Cancun meeting, combined with domestic and international politics of things like US steel tariffs and agricultural subsidies, might test the United States’ commitment to the WTO. Wallerstein goes further saying, “globalization is just about passe'. It was more or less buried at Cancun in September 2003.”

Despite these cracks in the armor, the labyrinthine WTO institutional framework still exists. Some small nations still fear that being left out of the WTO framework will preclude them from opportunities and open them to greater exploitation than if they join the WTO. Despite independent advice to the contrary, Nepal and Cambodia negotiated entry to the WTO in 2003, while Vietnam and others continue to strive for entry into the WTO by 2005.

Anticipating difficulties at the WTO negotiations in Cancun, the United States, and corporate insiders, advanced a divide-and-conquer fallback plan. Their first fallback position was to advance the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) at the November 2003 FTAA Ministerial meeting in Miami, FL. The FTAA would effectively extend the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, to cover the entire Western Hemisphere, except Cuba. In preparation for the Miami FTAA negotiations, the United States advanced several bilateral trade deals, the message being, “We’re creating trade deals. You’re going to be cut out if you don’t get on board through the FTAA.”

If the results of the Miami FTAA negotiations measure the success of this divide-and-conquer tactic, the tactic didn’t work as planned. Although the FTAA trade ministers presented a unified face of success for the mainstream media, the Miami talks did not make progress. "... everyone knows they can’t meet a January 2005 deadline," according to Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch. Some question the viability of the FTAA. Former World Bank Chief Economist, turned critic of free trade, Joseph Stiglitz sums it up, saying “it is beginning to look as though any success in the current round of trade talks will be based on agreements without substance.” Jeff Faux, of the Economic Policy Institute, and harsh critic of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), seems to question the influence of issues that are dear to the current global justice movement. He says “If the FTAA is permanently derailed, it will not be over a lack of social protections, but because Latin American and US business interests cannot make a deal.” If he's correct, this perspective could hint at how the GJM might retool its message.

Despite failed FTAA efforts in Miami, the divide-and-conquer strategy is still playing out in the Western Hemisphere. In December 2003, the United States and four Central American nations - El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua – concluded negotiations on the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Costa Rica withheld its signature in December, but eventually signed on in January 2004. Now Faux's theory about the role of social protections might be put to a test when the US Congress considers CAFTA. Senator Max Baucus, (MT), ranking Democrat on the Finance Committee, thinks that the agreement does not have the support necessary to win passage, in part because it lacks key environmental provisions. He argues these should be incorporated directly into CAFTA, and not as a side agreement like those in NAFTA (Inside EPA, Outlook 2004). To do so would entail reopening negotiations, leading to delay and possible failure, which might be Baucus' unstated intent.

The divide-and-conquer strategy was also exercised by the United States when signing a bilateral agreement with Chile in 2003. Faux's theory was supported in this case, as Congress authorized the agreement, which does not contain social protections. Trade negotiations are wrapping up with the Dominican Republic, the results of which could be plugged into the CAFTA framework. Negotiations are to begin with Panama, Columbia and Peru in 2004. In the Eastern Hemisphere, the US just reached a bilateral agreement Australia after talks nearly collapsed, and is seeking to conclude negotiations with Morocco in early 2004. The US plans to begin negotiations with Bahrain and Thailand before the end of 2004.

Whether or not the Bush Administration will press Congress take up the CAFTA treaty before elections in 2004 will reveal how they think the issue will play with the American public. This decision in itself will be a signal to watch for. In the face of damning retrospectives, which are coming out for the 10th anniversary of NAFTA, it might be in the Bush administration's interest to wait until after the elections to seek Congressional approval of CAFTA. These 10th anniversary analyses of NAFTA will provide powerful material for use in educational campaigns.

What other aspects of the global context, beyond explicit trade matters, might the global justice movement consider as they ponder tactics in 2004? The health of the economy could shade the mainstream public's receptivity to the global justice movement in general, and the DA component in particular. On the one hand, the recent US economic upturn could be cited by free traders as validation of their policies. In this light, DA actions could be perceived as a potential threat to people who believe their livelihood depends on this recovery.

On the other hand, it has been a "jobless economic recovery." The global justice movement can cite this as evidence that the corporations are profiting, and wealthy people are investing their Bush-tax-break-dollars into the stock market, while workers are discarded in a race to the bottom for cheap labor. Clearly, public perceptions of economic issues could color the view of global justice activists, which exemplifies the value of investing in educational outreach. Appealing to mass public sentiment was voiced by Baltimore activist Harvey, who said, “If there is going to be any change, it will have to come from a majority of the people rising up and reclaiming what is theirs, so we need to promote that.”

The global justice movement is maturing into a truly global movement, due in part to networking over the past several years through frameworks like the World Social Forum. This not only highlights the value of continued networking, but also implies the need for global strategies, or at least the global coordination of local strategies. As noted above, such strategies, implemented by the small vanguard that constitutes the movement, should consider how they will be perceived by the general public, if they hope to sway opinion to their side. However, US public sentiments are not the same as foreign public sentiments. Due in part to corporate media, US public opinion is isolated from world public opinion, the later generally being much less supportive of free trade agreements. This should be factored into any intentional global strategy.

Options for strategies have been hinted at above. This article closes with some thoughts on potential avenues for action. Jeff Faux thinks that NAFTA should be the focus of US activists. He argues that North American activists have influence over all three NAFTA nations, and should use this influence to build “a visible, sustainable challenge to the NAFTA model.” Referring to Chapter 11 of NAFTA, he says, “Provisions of NAFTA that erode the ability of the local public sectors in all three countries to promote the welfare of their citizens should be stricken.”

Bernie Sanders, Independent US Representative from Vermont, says, “The word is getting out and the momentum is building.” He argues for building a “new coalition of trade unionists, environmentalists, small-business owners and manufacturers who put people and their communities ahead of corporate America's reckless search for profits." That coalition should include “white-collar and high-tech workers who are also seeing their jobs move to low-wage countries.” Sanders lays out three immediate tasks for the US Congress, which could help inform GJM activist's thinking about strategy. First, would be “a moratorium on the passage of all new free-trade legislation the President is negotiating.” Second, “terminate those trade agreements that currently exist... such as NAFTA and PNTR with China.” Finally, “we need a national conversation and appropriate legislation to create trade policy that works for the average American as well as our trading partners throughout the world.” In other words, GJM activists should be able to voice viable alternatives to corporate globalization when interviewed by the corporate media.



It is always tempting to feel that the present time represents a turning point. The artificial “beginning,” marked by a new calendar year, tends to heighten this feeling. Some within the DA community suggest that the stark police power displayed in Miami might represent a turning point of sorts. Others point to the failed negotiations in both Cancun and Miami as signs of a turning point. McGuire echoes these sentiments, “It seems obvious that our movement has to change and grow. This might be a decisive year.” Such optimistic thinking has the healthy effect of energizing a movement, provided it is moderated by a dose of pragmatism. This seems to be the sentiment of the global justice movement as it looks toward the future standing at the threshold of 2004.

Sources:

Stiglitz, Joseph. “Can Globalization Fare Any Worse in 2004?” Business Day
Johannesburg, January 5, 2004

Wallach, Lori M., “The Beginning of the End of the FTAA: Crisis Leads to Scaling Back, Punting Hard Decisions With No Instructions to Overcome Differences,”
Statement of the Director, Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, November 20, 2003.

Faux, Jeff, “NAFTA at 10: Where Do We Go From Here?” The Nation, February 2, 2004.

Sanders, Bernie, “The View from Mexico,” The Nation, February 2, 2004.

Wallerstein, Immanuel, “Soft Multilateralism,” The Nation, February 2, 2004.

Inside EPA, Outlook 2004, “NAFTA Review, America's Pact Driving new Trade-Environment Debate,” Special Report, January 2004.

Interview with GJM Activist Ryan Harvey

Interview with GJM Activist Mike McGuire