By-polls for seats vacated by BNP-M on Nov 2

www.dawn.com/2006/09/16/top13.htm
By Saleem Shahid

QUETTA, Sept 15: The Election Commission of Pakistan has announced that by-elections on national and provincial assembly seats vacated by the Balochistan National Party (Mengal) will be held on November 2.

The NA-269 Khuzdar seat fell vacant due to resignation of Abdul Rauf Mengal. Balochistan Assembly seats PB-35 Khuzdar-3 and PB-4 Quetta-4 were vacated by MPAs Mir Mohammad Akbar Mengal and Mir Akhtar Hussain Lango. The three legislators had resigned in protest against the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti.

According to the schedule, nomination papers may be filed on September 22 and 23 and scrutiny of the papers would be held on September 25.

Appeals against acceptance or rejection of nomination papers may be filed till October 2, to be decided on October 9.

Candidates may withdraw nomination papers till October 10 and the final list of candidates will be released on October 11.

Pakistan's jehadi card harms it more than it hurts India
www.dailyindia.com/show/60708.php/Pakistans_jehadi_card_harms_it_more_than_it_hurts_India(COMMENTARY)
By Amulya Ganguli

The sequence was significant. Within a few days of the Israeli-style targeted assassination by the Pakistani Army of Baloch rebel leader Akbar Khan Bugti, Islamabad announced a truce with the tribal warriors of Waziristan, the badlands of the



northwest long believed to be the home of the Al Qaeda and the Taliban.




It was a curious capitulation by a country that America sees as its spearhead in the war against terror. But the reason for Pakistan making peace with the militants of Waziristan was obvious. Since Bugti's assassination had exacerbated the insurgency in Balochistan, Islamabad needed a ceasefire in the northwest since the Pakistan Army could not fight two battles at the same time.

Better a truce with the fundamentalists than with the Balochis since the rebellion of the latter revives memories of Bangladesh and portends another break-up of Pakistan. Evidently, if Pakistan loses Balochistan, it will bury the country's founding father Mohammed Ali Jinnah's two-nation theory even deeper into the benighted land.

Immediately after the Waziristan truce, President Pervez Musharraf flew to Kabul in an evident gesture of assurance to his Afghan counterpart, Hamid Karzai. But his admission before the media that the jehadis were active on both sides of the border could have hardly been of any solace to the beleagured Afghan leader. And, then, Musharraf flew to Brussels to declare that Taliban had grown stronger than before because of its grassroots support.

The entire scenario could hardly be more ominous. Five years after 9/11, the Taliban is stronger, intelligence about Osama bin Laden has become 'stone cold', according to the Americans, and Pakistan has retreated in disarray from an area which is the hotbed of terrorists, leaving them without any 'fear of challenge', as The Washington Post said.

Added to these nightmarish conditions along the Pakistan-Afghan border is the recent revelation of the Pakistani links to terrorist modules in Britain and the increase in the number of terrorist outrages in India, which are evidently the handiwork of similar modules.

Pakistan's official explanation for the presence of jehadis in the region is that they are remnants of the holy warriors who fought the Soviets. But what has been left unexplained is the role the Pakistani establishment - or at least sections of it - played in harbouring them after the departure of the Soviets, for possible use against India.

Even if, for argument's sake, it is conceded that Pakistan doesn't have any understanding - secret or otherwise - with the jehadis, the fact remains that they are able to function with relative ease because of the boost the country's rulers have given to the parties of religious extremism, which are grouped together under the aegis of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).

The MMA and the pro-Musharraf breakaway group of the Muslim League from former prime minister Nawaz Sharif's party were necessary to maintain a facade of democracy. But the consequent emasculation of the established parties such as Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party and Sharif's outfit has left the political field open for supporters of Islamic fundamentalism to rule the roost. An example of their clout is the government's retreat on the amendment of the notorious Hudood laws, which are dreaded by women.

The fallout of the military rulers' acts of stifling democracy and encouraging fundamentalism is that Pakistan has harmed itself far more than it has hurt India through the export of terror, as New Delhi alleges. Since the hardened and potential jehadis have realized that Pakistan offers a relatively safe place for hiding out and learning their craft in an atmosphere where Osama bin Laden is extolled, it is hardly surprising that British Muslims of Pakistani origin maintained such close links with their original homeland.

The end result is hugely damaging for 'normal' Pakistani society, as it gradually loses its familiarity with democratic functioning and becomes a haven for jehadis and, occasionally, even a victim of terrorist outrages, while the country itself earns the dubious reputation of being an epicentre of terrorism.

In the process, Pakistan's case for Kashmir has become weaker. Islamabad may have hoped that sustaining the terror machine in Jammu and Kashmir will focus international attention on this potential nuclear 'flashpoint' of the Indian subcontinent. But the spread of terror worldwide from the Pakistan-Afghanistan region has ensured that the international community now increasingly sees India as a victim. Moreover, it is also evident that an Indian retreat from Kashmir will only widen the base for the jehadis and not ensure self-determination for the people of the state, as Pakistan argues.

So, all of Pakistan's game plans have gone wrong because of its flirtation with militant fundamentalism, which it evidently regards as war and diplomacy by other means. As a consequence of Islamabad's follies, India is gaining ground all the time because of its vibrant democracy, booming economy and successful experiment with a multicultural system.

What is more, the problems it faces - the Maoist menace, farmers' suicides - do not seem insuperable because of the boisterous nature of its open society, which enables the people to see all aspects of the social and economic scene. Not surprisingly, the Maoists of Nepal - the ideological comrades of their Indian counterparts - have urged the latter to give up their futile armed struggle and join mainstream politics.

As the decades pass, Mohammed Ali Jinnah's folly of dividing the subcontinent becomes more and more apparent. As India marches ahead, Pakistan and Bangladesh are steadily falling behind.

(Amulya Ganguli is a political analyst. He can be reached at aganguli-AT-mail.com)

Copyright Indo-Asian News Service

Pakistan: Islamists March Ahead

By Abdullah M. Adnan

Al-Jazeerah, September 16, 2006
www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion%20editorials/2006%20Opinion%20Editorials/September/16%20o/Pakistan%20Islamists%20March%20Ahead%20By%20Abdullah%20M.%20Adnan.htm
As manifest in Pakistan government’s peace deal with tribal leaders for peace in the South and North Waziristan region bordering Afghanistan, much to the chagrin of the Bush administration, and ‘humiliation’ of ‘secular and pro-West lobbies’ on the issue of Islamic Hudood laws, Islamist parties are gaining political ground and seem set to play a more ‘pro-active’ role.

After much bloodshed, caused by Pakistan’s own army’s action in tribal areas as well as by the U.S. “hot pursuit” of “Taliban remnants” into Pakistan’s territory, the government felt compelled to end futile military action. While the alliance of six Islamist parties – Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) – had opposed military deployment (about 80,000 troops) against its own people and worked ceaselessly for an end to it, new governor of the Frontier province, Lt. General (retd) Ali Jan Orakzai also played key role. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) come under the direct jurisdiction of the Frontier’s governor, and the present incumbent also one of the tribes in the region.

On the issue of Hudood laws, MMA had threatened to resign en bloc from the parliament in case the government tried to thrust changes in the Hudood Ordinance repugnant to the teachings of Islam. This threat has only been ‘averted’ as the MMA and the ruling party (PML-Q) are approaching agreement on the changes in the light of the recommendations of the Ulema committee formed for the purpose.

MMA can claim victory in that it foiled attempts by ‘secular’ and ‘pro-West’ elements who wanted to bring about changes that were repugnant to Islam. It can now project its achievement that it blocked such moves by threat of ‘instant’ resignations and sought the way out through consultation and with guidance of Ulema (Islamic scholars).

The government can say that the agreement on the kind of changes, and the process adopted for this end, shows that it wants, and able, to resolve political issues with sagacity and prudence. Otherwise, as the Federal Information Minister, its chief spokesman, has in fact said that the government could have brought about the changes through an ordinance.

While the threat has only been ‘averted’ – the government has gained some ‘lease of life’ and the MMA has preserved the card to play at another time – it has the potential of disturbing the current ‘array of forces’ on both sides, the government as well as the Opposition. Government’s ally Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), a Karachi-based ethnic party whose leader Mr. Altaf Hussain is in London since 1992 in self-exile, is upset over the “writ of a few ulema against the view of the majority of the members of the assembly.”

Similarly, Pakistan Peoples Party-Parliamentarian (PPP-P) was supporting the government for amending the Hudood Ordinance. Wishing it could repeal the law entirely, the secular-minded PPP-P had in fact wanted more than the ‘cosmetic’ changes. So, will MQM part ways with the government at last (after coming close to tendering resignations on more than one occasion)? What line of action will the PPP-P now take?

Has this dealt a blow to what may be called unity of the Opposition on elusive one-point agenda? The mythical unity of the Opposition has been on “removing the present corrupt military regime.” Cricket-turned-politician Imran Khan, in another context, has been saying that there is no unity in the Opposition ranks, and that people would soon recognize the real and genuine Opposition from the bogus one. A couple of months ago, at a press conference in Karachi, he had said that his Tehrik-e-Insaf, Jamaat-e-Islami, and Muslim League-Nawaz were ready to tender resignations but Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam of Maulana Fazlur Rahman and Peoples Party of Benazir Bhutto were reluctant to go ahead in this direction. Maybe this provides the picture as to who would be in real opposition to the government.

But a change has occurred. Though ‘reluctant’ Maulana Fazl may appear, his emphasis in on ‘timing.’ He has brought home the message: Had MMA resigned earlier from the parliament, it would not have been in the position to play the role it has played. To which Qazi Hussain Ahmad, president of MMA and its another important component JI, may add: MMA could achieve this because of threat of resignations, and, therefore, the threat must remain there – looming large. This reflects Fazl’s ‘political astuteness’ and Qazi’s ‘revolutionary spirit’ and it is this combination that has brought MMA this far.

Moreover, given that Qazi has almost had his way on other issues that included his opposition to Fazl’s attending the National Security Council meetings (presided over by the commander-president), it appears that he will push for resignations at a more opportune time. The threat of resignations is really there; it has only been ‘averted’.

In the obtaining situation in the country, it is these two gentlemen who can, in fact, determine the course of politics and democracy. It were they who made the passage of the 17th Amendment possible – for wrong or right, and under whatever ‘illusions’ – it is they who can deny General Pervez Musharraf re-election from the same assemblies.

Qazi and Fazl, and with them their parties and their alliance, are willing to play a role far greater than this. With MMA as the ruling party in the Frontier province and partner in Balochistan’s coalition government, and Fazl himself Opposition Leader, it is natural that people are ‘critically evaluating’ their performance and expect that they play a lead role in reviving the 1973 Constitution, for the rights of provinces, and ensuring that the country continues the march toward democracy after the current assemblies have completed their tenure. And, obviously, they can do this only by maintaining unity of MMA and forging common-goal alliances with other parties.

Realizing the ‘burden of leadership,’ MMA appears to be ready to play ‘keeping the cards close to the chest’ and ‘hurl threats of resignations’ alternatively. It may resign step-by-step from provincial assemblies of Balochistan and the Frontier province and, finally, from the National Assembly to checkmate government moves in the provinces and frustrate General Pervez Musharraf’s plans to get ‘re-elected’ for another term.

After the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, prominent political leader and former governor of Pakistan’s western province of Balochistan, in a military action, MMA had considered parting ways with the provincial government (Besides its own government in the Frontier province, MMA is junior partner in Balochistan). But the issue of Hudood laws shifted the focus.

In an expression of solidarity with the Baloch people in this hour of grief, anger and despair as well as to show that it stands for their political and economic rights, MMA may resign from the provincial legislature any time now.

As MMA’s provincial parliamentary party is entirely made up of Fazl’s party, which is confined to Pashtun area, its parting ways at this critical time with the provincial government would bridge the Baloch-Pashtun rift in the province and enhance its standing among the Baloch.

Experiencing difficulties in running the Frontier province, MMA may press for implementation of National Financial Commission (NFC) Award, royalty issue, and similar matters. While demanding even-handed approach for smaller provinces, and providing proof to the contrary in the Frontier province, it may opt to give up its own government there – a couple of months after quitting the Balochistan government.

Having gained the high moral ground by resigning from the two provincial assemblies, MMA would then be in a position to ask PPP-P to quit Sindh Assembly along with it. Though sitting on the opposition benches in the provincial legislature, Peoples Party, in fact is the largest single party there. PPP-P and MMA were holding ‘endless’ talks for forming their coalition government in Sindh, but for their own weaknesses and for the cobbling together of assorted elements to deny the largest party its due, the two could not assume power in the important and sensitive province of Sindh.

It may be noted here that the “weakness” was Benazir Bhutto’s concern that her party entering into agreement with Islamists would tarnish her image abroad, i.e. the West, together with a lurking hope to cut a deal with the like-minded secular-oriented General Pervez Musharraf. Instead of giving her any benefit, her ‘fear’ and ‘temptation’ ruined the chances of her party rule in Sindh, and are causing disunity in the ranks of the Opposition.

Again, back to the main discourse. In the ‘final round of resignations,’ MMA may opt for quitting the National Assembly as well. Whenever the decision is taken to resign, the timing for this has to be adjusted so as to eliminate the possibility of General Pervez Musharraf’s re-election from the current assemblies.

Though ruling party says that by-elections would be held on seats falling vacant due to resignations. But, everyone knows it is easier said than done – because election procedure takes considerable time.

The threat of resignations can bring the government around – to where MMA wants it to be – or to toe. Recent episode on Hudood laws may serve as an example in this regard. Resignations-in-succession will bring the whole ‘painstakingly-erected’ edifice down.

The feeling among the MMA leadership is that they stand to gain in both – or all – situations, only if they could play their cards well. They think they should not merely be bent on bringing the government down, like other ‘traditional’ politicians. Instead, they should focus on their program: reinforcing Pakistan’s Islamic identity, ensuring continuation of political process and rule, and not to let Pervez Musharraf get “re-elected” in uniform from the same assemblies.

If the government is brought around to their viewpoint, it would add to MMA’s standing. If, on the other hand, the government does not budge, sensing or creating rifts in the Opposition ranks, then MMA’s quitting the assemblies in a “long drawn-out farewell” would give it a moral high ground and improve its image in the eyes of the people – whose vote it will seek in October 2007, scheduled time for next general elections, or even earlier.

Abdullah M. Adnan is a policy analyst working with the Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad. abdullah__adnan-AT-hotmail.com

The Battle for Balochistan

By Massoud Ansari

Interview: Jamil Bugti
The End Game
www.newsline.com.pk/NewsSep2006/cover1sep2006.htm

As soon as news of Nawab Akbar Bugti's death broke, mobile phone screens across the country registered a blitz of SMS messages, mourning, conjecturing and a few, celebrating the demise of Pakistan's most controversial tribal sardar. But even those that saw him as a trouble-maker had to concede that if not in life, in death the Nawab was a hero.

The manner in which he met his death - the details are still shrouded in controversy - gave a huge filip to the nationalist movement in Balochistan, which had hitherto been largely considered a "renegade movement" restricted to a few sardars and their followers. Furthermore, it brought various tribes that had long been engaged in bloody feuds with one another on to one platform.

"You know what Bugti did to us, but all that is now irrelevant," said Nawab Haji Lashkari, a chieftain of the Raisani tribe, which had been at war with Nawab Akbar Bugti's tribe for the last decade.

"His killing is terrible news for the entire Baloch nation. In our culture, even if we are embroiled in bloody feuds, when we are attacked by an outsider, we become one."

Lashkari added that Akbar Bugti's murder was a clear message: "'If you ask for your rights, you will be killed,' and if this is the case, then yes, we are ready to be killed," he declared. And as if echoing this sentiment, virtually every Baloch leader not only condemned the manner in which Nawab Akbar Bugti was killed, but also made it implicitly, if not overtly clear, that if the need arises they are ready to rise to the occasion.

It is not merely the Baloch who are up in arms. The opposition has cashed in on the outrage engendered by the Bugti killing by declaring it an example of government supression and ineptitude. And to make matters harder for the government, no politician from the ruling Pakistan Muslim League has publicly supported Bugti's death, with some even publicly condemning it.

Even the government's spin doctors have been unable to manufacture any face-saving device. This has caused visible nervousness in government circles and deep embarrassment to President General Pervez Musharraf. For the first time since he seized power in a coup in 1999, Musharraf and the army are under siege.

Just how delicate matters are can be gauged by the fact that when violence erupted in the province following Nawab Bugti's death, the government-backed leaders of the ruling party in Balochistan, who were asked to handle the issue, clearly communicated to Islamabad that the mishandling of the case had placed them in a very difficult situation. They contended that if they propagated the government position or attempted to do a whitewash of how Bugti had been killed, their lives would be in danger.

Even the Balochistan Chief Minister, Jam Yusuf of Lasbela, who as provincial leader had no choice but to call a press conference on the insistence of Islamabad, had his cronies request the journalists present not to ask tough questions. The ones that were fielded were answered evasively, and ultimately the event yielded little more than a pre-worded statement confirming Nawab Akbar Bugti's death.

The concerns of Jam Yusuf and the other pro-government leaders in the Balochistan government are valid. When a ghaibana namaz-e-janaza (ritual prayers said at the time of burial) was held at the Ayub Stadium in Quetta, and some Pakistan Muslim League (Q) leaders attempted to attend the meet, they were asked by the masses to leave the ground immediately or be prepared to "face the consequences."

The government has certainly not helped its own case, issuing statements, then retracting them and issuing fresh ones completely contradicting the earlier ones.

Soon after news of Akbar Bugti's demise broke on August 26, the federal minister for information, Mohammed Ali Durrani not only confirmed the death, but said the resistance offered by Nawab Bugti's men was so intense that arresting him alive was not even remotely possible. "The operation started on August 23 when one of the two helicopters sent on a tip-off about the presence of renegades in the Taratani area of Kohlu district came under fire. Another helicopter was hit by enemy fire shortly afterwards. The operation intensified on August 26 as the militants, operating out of heavily fortified bunkers, employed high-tech weaponry and killed seven security officials," declared Durrani.

At this juncture, the government had obviously not anticipated what a trigger this news would prove. When violence erupted across Balochistan, the government immediately backtracked from its earlier statement, and declared there was never an intent to kill Nawab Akbar Bugti, and the army soldiers who were deployed to apprehend him had been categorically ordered to "capture him alive."

Showing journalists the images of the mountains where the operation was launched, Major General Shaukat Sultan, the top spokesman of the army, now told mediamen that when some army personnel sought to enter the cave where Nawab Bugti was apparently hiding, they were assailed by heavy fire from inside. "They naturally returned fire and then something in the cave exploded. As a result, the cave collapsed, killing not only the servicemen at its mouth but also the inmates," declared the general.

Shaukat Sultan disclosed that the cave was about 100 feet long and had winding passages. Ironically, even while the government announced that because the cave had completely collapsed and turned into a huge heap of debris, it could take several days to retrieve the bodies of Akbar Bugti and the tribesmen who had perished with him, just a day later Shaukat Sultan told newsmen that nearly 100 million rupees, $96,000 (USD) in cash, two satellite phones, documents, eight AK-47 rifles and some rockets were found in the rubble. This left many wondering how all of these were so easily accessible considering the cave was, by the authorities own reckoning, virtually impossible to negotiate at that point.

That was not the end of the story. Five days after his death, Major General Shaukat Sultan announced that the Nawab's badly decomposed body had been recovered from his cave hideout. However, to lend further credence to conspiracy theories regarding the manner in which he had been killed, Bugti's body was not handed over to his family for identification or burial. Although the government did reportedly ask the Nawab's sons to come to Dera Bugti for the purpose, Jamil Bugti stated the family wanted the body to be brought to Quetta because, since the government had brought and settled a large number of their enemies in Dera Bugti and destroyed much of Akbar Bugti's property, there was nothing left for them to go back to, let alone bury their father there.

Citing the deteriorating condition of the corpse as the need for a hasty burial, official sources maintain that a local maulana identified Akbar Bugti and just hours after retrieving the body, performed his last rites. Then, in the presence of 16 locals and officials the Nawab was buried in a closed casket in his ancestral graveyard in Dera Bugti next to his younger brother, Ahmed Nawaz Bugti, and close to his grandfather, Nawab Shahbaz Khan Bugti, and son, Nawabzada Saleem Bugti.

Intriguingly, while people were disallowed from seeing Akbar Bugti's corpse, because, the authorities insisted, it was mutilated virtually beyond recognition by the rubble collapsing on him, the nawab's watch and glasses, which were subsequently handed over to his sons, miraculously had not even a scratch on them.

Startling disclosures about Nawab Akbar Bugti's death by reliable sources tell an interesting story - and one completely at variance with the official version.

According to these reports, the government launched its operation against the Bugtis on August 23 in the Taratani area of Kohlu district. Nawab Akbar Bugti, who was in the area, was reportedly asked to vacate the location within three days and told to command his men to surrender. However, the Nawab not only refused to leave the area, but allegedly abused the army officials. He did, however, reportedly give his comrades a choice: those who wanted to leave were free to do so, but those who stayed should be prepared to fight to the end. According to the information gleaned, some men left at this juncture, while over a dozen chose to stay and fight. Ironically, all those who left were later arrested by the army. On August 26, when army officials reached the cave in which Bugti and his men were staked out - ostensibly just to arrest him at this point - he reportedly chose to fight, leading from the front.

Nawab Akbar Bugti was allegedly killed along with several of his men in the battle, in which there was heavy firing. However, some of his tribesmen who survived the first round, presumably because they were deeper inside the cave, continued to fight, and in this round at least 17 army officials, including two colonels, two majors and other junior army personnel were reportedly killed. Later, army officials reportedly used a gunship helicopter to finish the few remaining tribesmen who had emerged and their corpses were subsequently dumped inside the cave.

It has been widely conjectured but not confirmed that Akbar Bugti's body was transported to Quetta the same day he was killed and kept in a mortuary at the Combined Military Hospital (CMH) there. However, sensing how combustible the situation was, the authorities could not go public with this information.

Although, presumably in a bid to quell all the rumours surrounding his death, the government has repeatedly offered to allow Akbar Bugti's sons to come to Dera Bugti, have their father's body exhumed and conduct a DNA test to determine if the corpse is indeed Bugti's, it is probably too little, too late.

It was not just the final chapter of the Bugti-government face-off that was badly botched by the authorities, but also the negotiations preceding it. The Chaudhry Shujaat and Mushahid Hussain-led delegation that met with Akbar Bugti last year, after hostilities had erupted between the Bugtis and the army in the wake of Dr. Shazia Khalid's alleged rape by an army major in Quetta, had reportedly managed to defuse the situation to a large extent. Nawab Akbar Bugti had reportedly agreed to bury his guns if the government acted on the committee's recommendations, which including paying him compensation of 25 crore rupees for the damage done to his property and that of his people in Dera Bugti.

Rather than paying heed to the recommendations, however, sources disclosed, President Musharraf dug in his heels and opted for a confrontation with the Nawab, reportedly after he was convinced by a top boss of one of the intelligence agencies and the head of a gas company that Bugti was the leader of the Balochistan Liberation Army and was receiving help from assorted foreign countries.

In various speeches Musharraf had often attacked the three Baloch Sardars, Marri, Mengal and Bugti, calling them "corrupt," and holding them reponsible for all the problems in Balochistan. However, most of his ire, it seemed, was reserved for Bugti. He was first restricted to his house, then driven out of that, and finally even driven out of his own area, where his opponents were brought and lodged with the blessings and active support of the army. The final nail in the coffin came when two days before he was killed, Akbar Bugti was removed as chief of the tribe, after a jirga of Bugti tribesmen, hand-picked and assembled in Dera Bugti by the government, declared him a "proclaimed offender," and seized his property.

Pushed to the wall, in his twilight years, with little to lose and only a reputation to gain, Bugti now decided to direct a guerrilla campaign against General Musharraf and the army.

There is a general consensus that Nawab Akbar Bugti was never part of the BLA, which aims for an independent Balochistan. Rather, his fight was for a greater share of the province's resources. It is therefore surprising that the government concentrated its energies mainly on the Nawab and the Dera Bugti district, even while attacks were increasing in the rest of the province, especially in the tribal areas.

While it is admittedly not exclusively the Bugti tribe that has felt the wrath of the government, it has been at the forefront of the receiving end of the authorities' actions.

Ever since the army operation started in Balochistan, scores of people have been picked up from across the province by the agencies on charges of "spying for an enemy country" or for their alleged connections with the shadowy BLA, and not been heard of since. Many of these have been Bugtis or had connections with them. Their relatives have lodged FIRs, filed habeas corpus petitions, staged hunger strikes, and held press conferences charging agency sleuths with kidnapping, but to date, this has been of little avail. The missing remain just that.

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has stated on record that the military has indiscriminately bombed civilians and launched a campaign of fear in the province, marked by torture, disappearances and custodial killings. And the interior minister has admitted that 4,000 people have been arrested in connection with the Baloch conflict, but no exact figure of those missing is yet available.

One of those reportedly picked by agency sleuths is Abdul Rauf Sasoli, a renowned leader of the Jamhoori Watan party. Earlier this year, he took journalists to Dera Bugti to show them the damage caused by the army in the area, and on February 2, shortly after his return to Karachi where he was residing, he went missing. There has been no news of him since then.

Likewise, Hanif Sharif, a Baloch writer was picked up from Kaich district while sharing a meal with friends at a local restaurant on January 15. Nobody has heard of him thereafter.

Munir Mengal, a TV journalist, was picked up by FIA personnel from Karachi airport on April 7, 2006, shortly after he disembarked from his flight. He had come to Karachi to appoint people for the TV channel 'Voice of Balochistan' that he was planning to launch. His mother has staged hunger strikes and gone to every possible forum to secure the release of her son, but to date he is nowhere to be found.

A Bugti tribesman, who had a post-graduate degree from the Tando Jam Agriculture University in Sindh, was picked up from Quetta after agency operatives discovered Akbar Bugti's telephone numbers in his diary. They kept him blindfolded at a camp for nearly three months, but failing to get any information from him, subsequently released him.

Requesting not to be named for fear of a backlash, the young man disclosed that at the time he was picked up, he was to appear in a viva voce of the provincial commission examination in which he had already qualified. However, because of his illegal confinement during this period he could not appear in the exam, and lost out on a promising career - and a lifelong ambition.

He described how during custody he was subjected to extreme mental and physical torture, which was perhaps exacerbated by the fact that he had nothing to offer his captors. He could provide them no information about his sardar, the BLA or their alleged training camps. But he was one of the lucky ones - he got away.

There are reportedly dozens of other genuinely apolitical youths like him who have been subjected to similar ordeals which have pushed them into the ranks of the rebels.

According to official estimates, in the past two years, saboteurs have staged nearly 27,000 rocket attacks aimed at military personnel and outposts, government installations and foreign nationals in Balochistan. In 2005, approximately 1,568 "terrorist" attacks have occurred in the province and these attacks have not been confined to the tribal areas.

Government sources maintain that weapons worth 50 crore rupees have been procured from Afghanistan by the "Baloch insurgents" in the past two years to enable them to carry out their guerrilla war.

In his report, 'The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism,' compiled in 2006, Frédéric Grare, a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think tank, says there are three separate but linked issues that bear on Balochistan today: the national question, the role of the army, and the use of Islamism. But he contends that the national question is obviously central.

There has long been frustration amongst the Baloch who have felt virtually colonised by the Punjabi-dominated central government and hold it responsible for the absence of economic and social development in the province, despite the fact that it possesses almost 20 per cent of the country's mineral and energy resources. Military action against the Baloch by successive governments every time they have raised their voice and demanded their rights has made the people feel further marginalised. This feeling has fomented into real anger that is now spilling over.

Many Baloch grievances are certainly justified. The first deposits of natural gas were discovered in Sui in 1953. Gas was supplied to cities in the Punjab as early as 1964, but Quetta, the capital of Balochistan, had to wait until 1986 for its share of gas - and that too only because at that time the government decided to extend the gas pipeline to provide the facility to the military garrison it had decided to station in the provincial capital.

Similarly, in the Dera Bugti district, home to the gas fields of Sui and Pircoh, only the actual town of Dera Bugti is supplied with gas, and here again, it receives its supplies only because a paramilitary camp was opened there in the mid-1990s. Overall, only four of the 26 districts constituting Balochistan are supplied with gas.

Conversely, natural gas is supplied to almost every single village in the Punjab and Sindh. In fact, Punjab today is known as a "The mother of Condensed Natural Gas (CNG) stations," since almost every car in the province has been converted from a petrol consumer to a CNG one. Meanwhile, there is not a single CNG station in the entire province of Balochistan.

For almost 60 years since independence, 95 per cent of Balochistan has been considered a 'B-area', which essentially means that it has been ruled by the levies or semi-private forces of pro-government sardars. Ironically, when the government initiated mega development projects in the province recently, and found the levies force incapable of handling the 'insurgents,' it suddenly decided to dispense with their services and bring some areas under the control of the regular administration. However, other areas, where the government had major interests, are likely to come under the vigil of the Pakistan army. The government is now planning to construct military garrisons in the three most sensitive areas of Balochistan - Sui, with its gas-producing installations; Gwadar, with its port; and Kohlu, the "capital" of the Marri tribe, to which most of the nationalist hard-liners belong. The government apparently believes that by establishing these garrisons it will be able to contain the Balochistan insurgency.

The anti-Baloch bias is visible even in the civilian set-up. Most officials working in senior positions in Balochistan belong to the Punjab or other provinces. From chief secretary to inspector general, police, to most government secretaries working in Balochistan, they are all outsiders. "If you visit the Balochistan secretariat, check out the name plates outside each office. You will find virtually no locals running provincial affairs," Nawab Akbar Bugti would often tell visitors.

The manner in which he was killed, however, proved to be the straw that broke the camel's back. The government compounded a history of errors against the Baloch by falling into the trap set by Akbar Bugti. He was certainly not the most radical of the sardars. Over the years he had done business with various governments. And in the process he had even been accused by the nationalists of betraying them. But in the end, Bugti decided to redeem himself: he decided to fight for Balochistan - and if that meant to the death, so be it. The manner in which he was eliminated not just immortalised him as a hero, but fueled the fires of Baloch nationalism and separatism.

Since the disgruntled Baloch has always seen the army as the enemy - and the Punjabi and army are seen as synonymous - in the wake of Nawab Akbar Bugti's killing the Baloch youth have declared a war against all Punjabis. The victims of this have been the innocent Punjabi settlers who have lived in the province for generations.

Following Akbar Bugti's death, rioters in Balochistan not only destroyed government offices, but also attacked shops owned by Punjabi settlers. So far at least four Punjabis have been killed, and the others, for whom Balochistan is the only home they know, live in terror.

A Punjabi-speaking barber was killed when unidentified people entered his house in Naushki town and fired at him. The attackers escaped from the scene. Around 10 barber shops and a number of government buildings have also been damaged and ransacked in the town. Two teenage Punjabi boys, Shahnam Javed and Umair Akhtar were killed in Smuglli in Quetta city when they were taking a stroll near their house after dinner. And there have reportedly been copycat murders in Karachi: two young Punjabi boys were recently murdered by unknown militants in the Baloch area of Lyari.

Given the sensitivity of the situation and fearing for their lives, Pakistan army jawans took into custody over 30 men from the Punjab who were working as daily wage labourers in the Chagi district of Balochistan, and sent them back to the Punjab.

Following Bugti's death, members of parliament from the Baloch Nationalist Party (BNP) resigned from their seats and some nationalist Baloch leaders, who earlier used to vent their anger privately, have now openly started demanding secession for the province. They say the time has come for a "decisive battle."

Said MNA Rauf Mengal of the BNP, "Now there is no choice but to fight for liberation from Pakistan." Mengal contended that the actions of the "Punjab-dominated establishment" and its "political cronies" had made the people of Balochistan lose all hope that their problems could be resolved through political dialogue.

The mishandling of the Bugti affair has already cost the present government heavily, and today it stands isolated as even members of its coalition have distanced themselves. Political analysts believe that this is merely the beginning of a long, hard battle. They predict a full-fledged insurgency in Balochistan, and the deployment of many more troops to crush it, which could bleed both, the army's personnel and resources dry.

"The writing on the wall is clear: with army troops already deployed on the eastern and western borders, [and new deployment in Balochistan] defence force expenditure will increase, resulting in an increase in the defence budget. Foreign elements will also take advantage of the situation," says Major General (Retd) Talat Masood.


Same old charade

www.dailypioneer.com/columnist1.asp
President Pervez Musharraf's strategy to position Pakistan as a victim of terrorism is dangerously misleading. Pakistan has been a fulcrum of terrorist violence for over two decades now. Pakistan sheltered, trained and armed bands of terrorists (under the guise of a religious war) for the US to help drive out the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. This is well documented even by Pakistani analysts. Even Gen Musharraf himself admitted on September 12 in Brussels, "We launched a jihad, brought in mujahideen from all over the Muslim world; we armed the Taliban and sent them in; we did it together." After the Western nations achieved their objective of ousting the Soviet troops, Pakistan quietly moved the so-called 'soldiers of jihad' towards Jammu & Kashmir.

Kashmir is at the core of terrorism launched by Pakistan against India. In the Army's perception, "Kashmir is so strategically situated that it can be used to cripple Pakistan economically and militarily." Over the years, the Army exploited these fears to turn Kashmir into a question of identity, an "unfinished task of Partition". Gen Musharraf's claims should be tested on this anvil. Is there a change in Pakistan's Kashmir policy?

Since it is the Chief of the Army Staff or the President who dictates policies on "vital national interests" like Kashmir in Pakistan, it is entirely possible to assess changes in the policy by analysing the recent statements of President Musharraf himself who is both the Chief of Army Staff and the President. His address in Muzaffarabad on Kashmir Solidarity Day on February 5 befits such an analysis. He made it clear by stating: "I want to repeat it in this gathering that our agenda is the same as before - the right of self-determination and plebiscite for the Kashmiri people." This is an unequivocal affirmation of the past policy. His reiteration that "Kashmir runs in Pakistan's veins and my veins" is no different either, whether in letter or spirit, from his address to the nation on January 12, 2002, confirming that despite talks of reconciliation and solution, the establishment in Pakistan, the Army, has not altered its historical stand on Kashmir.

The past is further affirmed by Gen Musharraf's consistent reference to the "Indian Held Kashmir" as the "nation fighting for their freedom", a view consistent with what he said in February 2005: "...a freedom struggle is not terrorism...this should be clear to all." His clarification that without the "struggle of Pakistan forces", Kashmir would not have been in the limelight only strengthens his subsequent view that "our original agenda is the same as it was before".

Although Gen Musharraf has been claiming action against terrorist groups, security forces have only been targeting either Al Qaeda leaders (on the US list) or sectarian outfits. By Gen Musharraf's own admission on July 21, 2005, terrorist groups, during his regime, have "mushroo-med in cities which recruit people openly, train them, collect donations and publish and distribute jihadi literature". What he did not say was that it could be a conscious decision on the part of his Government to keep the jihadi infrastructure alive as an insurance policy on Kashmir in case the peace process, especially the dialogue on Kashmir, gets mired in bickering and protests, and fails to yield any tangible results for Pakistan within a visible time.

Another point that betrays Gen Musharraf's manufactured truth is the rise of terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) despite the multiple bans across the world. Till recently, Pakistan refused to proscribe the group's parent organisation, Jamaat-ud Dawa and instead allowed it to set up new infrastructure in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, Punjab and Sindh. There are credible reports in the Pakistan media about large-scale recruitment carried out by the group from rural areas in Punjab, Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province and the huge amount of donations and contributions garnered from various national and international sources. The group has recently set up 54 al Dawa schools in Punjab, 11 in Sindh and one in Quetta, Balochistan.

Although LeT's chief Hafiz Saeed has been put under house arrest, more to protect him from being interrogated by the British and US intelligence agencies for the London plot, his organisation has been masterminding terror attacks in India. There is clear evidence of LeT hand in the July Mumbai bombings.

The General will have to show courage in acting against terrorist groups spawned and sheltered by the Pakistan Army before pretending to be the victim of terrorism. Till, it is the same old charade.

Nato backs down over Pakistan ultimatum
By Ahmed Rashid in Islamabad
(Filed: 16/09/2006)
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml

Key Nato countries have decided not to issue a diplomatic ultimatum to Pakistan which demanded that it ends its support for the Taliban and arrests leaders living in Pakistan.

Nato is placing all its hopes on a critical three-way meeting at the White House on Sept 27 when President Bush is due to meet Pakistani President Pervaiz Musharraf and Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

Two months ago senior diplomats from four Nato countries (Britain, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands), whose troops are fighting an estimated 8,000 Taliban in southern Afghanistan, urged their governments collectively to issue a démarche to Pakistan's military regime.
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They want it to arrest those Taliban commanders openly operating out of Quetta, capital of Baluchistan province, which adjoins Afghanistan.

However, after a fierce debate on the issue the démarche was cancelled, with Nato members divided on whether or not to pressurise Pakistan.

Britain cited co-operation with Pakistani intelligence in uncovering the recent terrorist plot to attack planes departing London airports.

But a Western ambassador in Islamabad said there was a consensus among Nato, US and UK intelligence officers in Afghanistan that Quetta is "the command and control centre for Taliban planning, logistics, and recruitment in Afghanistan".

Pakistan denies that it is sponsoring the Taliban. But for the first time since 2001 President Musharraf admitted this week in Brussels that the Taliban are using Pakistani soil to carry out attacks in Afghanistan.

The recent intense fighting in southern Afghanistan is partly a Taliban attempt to carve out a safe haven where its leaders can reside during the winter months when fighting winds down.

Pakistan Returns 2,500 Terrorists To Jihad
Nuclear Power Orders al-Qaeda and Taliban Prisoners Freed, Including Top al-Qaeda Leaders
By Steve Schippert

inbrief.threatswatch.org/2006/09/pakistan-returns-2500-terroris/

In what could be the most troubling development in the War on Terror since it began, Pakistan has released nearly all of the Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists it has had in custody since the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Since the invasion, Pakistan has taken into custody thousands of al-Qaeda terrorists and Taliban fighters. But with Pakistan’s inability to defeat or control the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance on the Pakistani side of the Afghanistan border, Mushrraf has ceded land, arms and now all terrorists held prisoner.

The Telegraph cites Pakistani lawyers who claim that the Pakistani government has “freed 2,500 foreigners who were originally held on suspicion of having links to al-Qaeda or the Taliban over the past four years.” This number includes virtually all al-Qaeda prisoners in Pakistan’s custody, including those held for the beheading of Wall Street Journal writer Daniel Pearl.

These terrorists can now be considered on the road to return to carrying out their terrorist duties, with destinations not only in Pakistan, but around the world. Of the interviewed, one is headed to Bangladesh and the other to Algeria.

Just who is facilitating their travel is of particular note: al-Khidmat Foundation.

While the al-Khidmat Foundation is described as a “welfare organisation run by the hard-line Islamist party Jamaat-i-Islami,” it is far from that. It is the Maktab al-Khidmat, the group founded in 1980 by Usama bin Laden’s mentor and ideological inspiration, Abdullah Azzam. Its primary purpose was then and is now to serve as “a support organization for Arab volunteers for the jihad in Afghanistan” and elsewhere today. Usama bin Laden financed this group from its inception. It is from this group that al-Qaeda sprang to life in 1989.

To separate the ‘al-Khidmat Foundation’ from al-Qaeda today is to separate the Department of Transportation from the United States Federal Government. This is who the Pakistani government released the terrorists to under the guise of a charity foundation.

While NATO commanders warn of a forming new Taliban sanctuary in Afghanistan’s Farah Province along the Iran border, an already-created Taliban sanctuary exists – officially – in Pakistan along Afghanistan’s southern border.

Seeking a way out of the bloody mess in the Waziristan provinces, Pakistan ceded North Waziristan to the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance to add to South Waziristan. Talks are ongoing for the same treatment throughout the North West Frontier Province to achieve an expansion of the forming Taliban-al-Qaeda empire, creeping persistently closer to Islamabad. But Musharraf granted far more than just land.

But, as Pakistan cedes more and more, the Taliban are failing to honor their end of the agreement on a regular basis, an agreement which contained their promise to cease kidnappings and targeted killings, particularly of Pakistani government officials.

It was indeed previously mentioned that Pakistan was releasing Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists as part of the North Waziristan deal, but no one expected a wholesale release of nearly all imprisoned since as long ago as 2001.

At the behest of Pervez Musharraf, over 2,500 jihadis have stepped foot once again on the road to jihad. This is a potentially devastating development when considered within the context of recent Pakistani ‘terms of defeat.’

This is a nuclear power that is currently ceding swaths of its own territory to Islamic terrorists with a global reach. Seemingly in an effort to seek personal peace, its secular leader is returning thousands of able, experienced and trained terrorists to the hands of an encroaching enemy with violent religious motivation. Yet the bulk of Pakistan’s professional army stands watch over the Indian border or waging an intense and bloody war for control of Baluchistan’s natural resources. al-Qaeda seeks to control something else.

The consequences are grim and the outlook is not good.

Independent report finds gross human rights violations in Balochistan

www.zeenews.com/znnew/articles.asp

Karachi, Sept 16: A fact finding report has found that Balochistan witnessed gross human rights violations during fighting between the armed forces and militants in the Dera Bugti and Sui which resulted in the killing of innocent civilians, including women and children.

It also found that civilian property, including mosques and places of worship of minorities, were destroyed during the fighting. Besides, the report documented some other incidents as well, including those in which three Chinese engineers had been killed.

The Ansar Burny Trust International (ABTI) compiled the report after visits of its team to the affected areas and meetings with the victim's families, reported The News.

The ABTI teams conducted four surveys in Dera Bugti and Sui between December 2005 and August 2006 when the fighting between militants and armed forces was at its peak in which rocket propelled grenades, medium range rockets, anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, surface-to-air missiles, land mines and ammunitions were used on both sides, said the paper.

The report claimed that the Frontier Constabulary (FC) was responsible for summary executions on January 11, 2006, when the FC personnel shot dead 12 militants near Patar Nara, Dera Bugti. The militants were unarmed and under custody when they were shot dead.

According to the report, on December 17 last year, armed forces attacked two residential areas Jabbar and Pekal and used fighter jets and helicopter gunships for the attack, which resulted in civilian casualties. An exact figure of dead and injured persons could not be obtained. Unofficial reports claimed that more than six civilians had been killed while 14 were injured. Scores of the Marri militants were also killed in this attack.

In an attack of the armed forces on March 17, 2006, 67 civilians were killed while 55 were injured, added the report.

Bureau Report