Keeping the Scientists Happy? From the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to Bunker-Busting Nukes

by Kristan Markey

In 2001, Congress invested over $100 billion into the national science infrastructure. With so much money around, major lobbyists from defense companies, professional associations, universities, and federal agencies vie for dollars. Naturally there is waste: for example, some universities have research funded directly by Congress without undergoing merit review. Few initiatives, however, are as large or misdirected as the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) that the Department of Energy (DOE) oversees to test the functioning of the nuclear stockpile without actually exploding the warheads. While objection to this program from within the activist, scientific, and legislative communities is not new, the current push to develop nuclear "bunker-busting" bombs has highlighted the need to review the program's history. Rather than simply guaranteeing the functioning of existing warheads, the SSP continues new weapon design albeit without detonation testing.

Following the 1992 Congressional moratorium on nuclear weapons testing and initiation of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) talks, the Department of Energy commissioned a study to investigate the long-term viability of US nuclear weapons under a no-testing regime. The study¹ asked a respected group of scientist-advisors called the JASONs to evaluate Science Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS, refers to the science aspect of the SSP). However, as detailed in an analysis by Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group², this peer-review process was inherently flawed and contradictory. He noted that the JASONs

The option of regularly remanufacturing the nuclear componentry is ignored (since the design worked in the first place, it should continue to work if copied exactly). Richard Garwin³, one of the JASONs and author of Megawatts and Megatons, has pointed out that the new programs are primarily designed to maintain skilled technical staff capable of designing nuclear weapons in the future, as well as support other lab programs. Furthermore, the JASON report emphasizes that this potentially unpopular aspect of the SSP needed to be downplayed in domestic and international circles to soothe proliferation concerns. Finally, in recent declassified documents, DOE has stated although weapons were tested prior to the CTBT, they considered this unnecessary to insure stockpile reliability⁴.

In their drive to justify the continuing scientific expenses, the top scientists at the national labs have pushed for the development of new bunker-busting nuclear bombs. The misconceptions of these weapons was analyzed by the Federation of American Scientists⁵. Specifically, the physics of missiles limit their penetration to less than 100 feet, which is far below the 230 feet needed to contain the radioactive blast of even a 0.1 kiloton weapon (which is smaller than the proposed bunker bombs). Furthermore, the capabilities that defense officials seek are already present in existing, deployed weaponry (such as the GBU-28) that will not throw up clouds of radioactive dust.

If the historical trends hold, the weapons are likely to be developed, but, like their tactical counterparts of the 1960's (nuclear weapons as small as 0.01 kT were deployed), will never be utilized as commanders realize the implications of using them. In the interim, international nuclear security will decrease, as the non-proliferation credibility of the US drops with new weapon deployment. Additionally, by keeping an entire secret branch of physics alive, the US spends an extra $2.5 billion/year and misdirects mental talent from more useful pursuits. Unfortunately, this is all a high price to pay for keeping the scientists happy.